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OBSCURING THE STANDARD FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING LIABILITY
SEC v. Aaron*
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the 1934 Act) con-
templates a broad scheme to compel disclosure and prevent
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The
principal antifraud provision of the 1934 Act is section 10(b)2
which makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national se-
curities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance."3 Section 10(b) is not
self-enforcing, but under section 21(d) of the 1934 Act,' the Se-
curities Exchange Commission (SEC) is authorized to enlist the
aid of the district courts to enjoin conduct in violation of section
10(b). Furthermore, although Congress did not expressly grant
private parties a right of action under section 10(b), a private
right of action to recover damages sustained as a result of a vio-
lation of the prohibitions of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 has
* 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 227 (1979). Before Anderson, Fein-
berg and Timbers, J.J.; opinion per Timbers, J.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
2 Id. § 78j(b).
3 Id. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any aecur-
ity.registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
, Id. § 78u(d). Section 21 allows the Commission to bring suit in federal court to
enjoin "any person [who] is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constitut-
ing a violation of any provision of [the securities laws]." Id. Section 21(d) also authorizes
the SEC to "transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or prac-
tices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the neces-
sary criminal proceedings under this chapter." Id.
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long been recognized.5
In 1976, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme
Court held that, in a private damage action under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, liability may not be imposed in the absence of a
showing that the defendant acted with scienter.7 The Court de-
clined, however, to address the question of the requisite state of
mind for the granting of relief in SEC enforcement actions.8
Several circuits have held that the SEC need not show sci-
enter in order to obtain relief in enforcement actions;9 other
courts have held that scienter is an essential element.10 The Sec-
ond Circuit consistently has held that the SEC may enjoin viola-
tions of section 10(b) by showing only that the defendant acted
negligently.1
A private right of action under § 10(b) was recognized initially in Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and has been accepted by
the Supreme Court. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
6 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
" Id. at 193. Following the common law definition of scienter, the United States
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder defined scienter as "a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. The traditional com-
mon law concept of scienter, however, is a requisite element of the torts of deceit and
misrepresentation. In discussing scienter, Dean Prosser noted that liability for deceit will
be imposed on a defendant who intends to deceive or who knows that his statement is
false or who lacks sufficient basis to know that his statement is true. W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). In defining the requisite knowledge, the "courts
have stopped short of the situation where the defendant honestly believes that he knows
and [believes] that his statement is true, but is negligent in not obtaining accurate infor-
mation." Id. at 686. With respect to the tort of misrepresentation, scienter has been
defined as an "intent to deceive, to mislead, [or] to convey a false impression." Id. § 107,
at 700. The requisite intent which underlies culpability has been found where the
"speaker believes his statement to be false [or when a] representation is made without
any belief as to its truth, or with reckless disregard" as to its truth or falsity. Id. at 701.
1 Justice Powell stated that "[s]ince this case concerns an action for damages we
also need not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action
for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
9 See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v.
World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d
1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., 452 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir.
1971); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55, 866-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (majority and concurring opin-
ions), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
10 See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. Wills, 472 F.
Supp. 1250, 1269-71 (D.D.C. 1978).
" See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
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The defendant's state of mind also has been a critical factor
in determining the liability of an aider and abettor. The ap-
proaches taken by the various circuits have been more uniform
in this area, in that they have refused to impose liability for aid-
ing and abetting another's wrongful conduct when it is demon-
strated that the defendant did not have knowledge of the wrong
and was merely negligent.12
The question of the defendant's state of mind becomes ad-
ditionally complex when the court is confronted with an injunc-
tive enforcement proceeding in an aiding and abetting context.
In SEC v. Aaron,15 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its prior hold-
ings that scienter is not a necessary element in SEC enforcement
actions, notwithstanding the fact that the court imposed liability
on the defendant ultimately for aiding and abetting. The court
did not address either the traditional elements of aiding and
abetting liability14 or the rationale for extending the negligence
standard to aiding and abetting situations. By so extending the
negligence standard to aiding and abetting liability in enforce-
(1979); SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC
v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d
801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v.
Everest Mgmt Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Cen-
ters, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanley v. SEC. 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir.
1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub. nor. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
However, in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
affd on different grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), the Southern District of New York
ruled that the Hochfelder holding must be read to require scienter "whether suit is
brought by the SEC or by a private litigant." Id. at 1241. The court decided that because
the Hochfelder Court found the "language and history of § 10(b) [to be] dispo3tive" as to
the scienter issue in private damage actions, id. at 1240-41 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33), the language and history are equally dispositive when
the SEC is the plaintiff. Id.
The court in Bausch & Lomb also addressed the fact that the Hoch(elder court found
no need to examine policy considerations, a factor that traditionally has been relied on in
distinguishing injunction actions and private damage actions. Id. at 1241. See text ac-
companying notes 46-60 infra. On appeal, the Second Circuit disposed of the case on
other grounds, finding it unnecessary to reach a determination of the scienter issue. 565
F.2d 8, 14. In declining to address the scienter issue, the court stated "[w]e need not now
decide whether Hochfelder mandates abandonment of our long.standing rule that proof
of past negligence will suffice to sustain an SEC injunction action." Id.
See text accompanying notes 118-50 infra.
13 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 227 (1979).
14 Id. at 616-17.
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ment actions without discussing the fundamental elements of
such liability, the Aaron opinion generates further uncertainty
in an already chaotic area of securities law.15
Peter Aaron was a long-term employee of his father's
brokerage firm, E. L. Aaron & Company (Aaron & Co.).1 Al-
though he was not designated a corporate officer, he performed
many supervisory duties as liaison between departments and
overseer of the firm's salesforce and registered representatives.
In 1974, Aaron & Co. expanded its operations by opening a
new branch office, to be managed by Norman Schreiber with the
assistance of Donald Jacobson, two registered representatives
employed by the brokerage firm. From the time the branch of-
fice opened until September 1975, Schreiber and Jacobson
worked to create a market for the common stock of Lawn-A-Mat
Chemical & Equipment Corporation (LAM). Specifically, they
solicited orders from LAM's stockholders and franchise dealers
for the purchase of additional LAM shares. In the course of
these solicitations, they represented to the prospective purchas-
ers that LAM was planning to develop and manufacture new-
style equipment, and predicted substantial increases in the price
of LAM's stock. There was no basis for these representations be-
cause LAM had experienced significant losses during this pe-
riod.17 Although LAM's officers and counsel informed Schreiber
and Jacobson that LAM had no such plans, the registered repre-
sentatives continued to make these statements.
Peter Aaron had knowledge of these false representations
from two sources. He was informed directly by LAM's counsel
that Schreiber's and Jacobson's statements were false and that
the two men had been so advised. In addition, because part of
his duties at Aaron & Co., included maintaining LAM's due
diligence file, "he had ample independent reason to know"18 that
LAM had no intention of manufacturing a new line of
equipment.
"5 See text accompanying notes 107-12 infra.
16 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts presented have been culled from opinions of
the district court, SEC v. E. L. Aaron & Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,043 at 91,681-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
100 S.Ct. 227 (1979), and the Second Circuit, SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 100 S.Ct. 227 (1979).
17 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,683.
Is 605 F.2d at 615.
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In connection with its underwriting arrangement with LAM,
Aaron & Co. solicited stock sales by the president and vice-pres-
ident of LAM. Because LAM's president and vice-president
were controlling persons of the company,11 their shares could not
be sold unless the shares either were registered pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), or exempt from the regis-
tration requirements of that Act.20 In an effort to avoid registra-
tion and to meet the requirements necessary for an exemption,
Aaron & Co. employed an intermediary brokerage firm to effec-
tuate the sale.
Since Aaron & Co. wanted to acquire the LAM shares for its
own account, it could not solicit customers' orders to buy LAM
stock without violating the requirements of rule 144. Accord-
ingly, Aaron attempted to qualify for the exemption by arrang-
ing for another brokerage firm, Weller & Co., to purchase the
LAM shares from the president and vice-president of LAM and
then resell the shares to Aaron & Co. Thus, Aaron & Co. hoped
that Weller & Co. would act as the control persons' agent in the
sale of their shares, thereby allowing Aaron & Co. to sell the
shares without registration.21
In 1976, in an effort to halt these disreputable practices, the
SEC commenced an enforcement action against Peter Aaron and
19 The definition of the term "control person" must be viewed in terms of section
2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976), which defines the term "issuer" as
"any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer." The Aaron court's finding that
both LAM's president and vice-president were controlling persons was predicated upon
the fact that both individuals were officers and directors of the corporation. 605 F.2d at
615.
" Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976), prohibits the sale of
unregistered securities unless either the securities themselves or the transaction is ex-
empt from the registration requirements. See §§ 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, id. §§ 77c, 77d.
Section 4(4), id. § 77d(4), sets forth the exemption relevant in Aaron. It provides
that "brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the
over-the-counter market" are exempt from registration, although solicitation of such
orders is not exempt. Id.
The SEC has promulgated rule 144(0, 17 C.F.R § 230.144(0 (1979), as a guide to
those who seek to execute transactions exempt under § 4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1976).
Rule 144(f) provides that the broker executing the sale of securities "shall not.., solicit
or arrange for the solicitation of [customers'] orders to buy the securities in anticipation
of or in connection with such transaction." 17 C.F-R. § 230.144(0.S11 [ 977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SFc. L REP. (CCH) at 91,683. The court, however,
determined that the transaction was a sham and therefore outside the protection of the
§ 4(4) exemption. Id. at 91,685-86.
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Aaron & Co. in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York. The complaint charged Aaron with,
inter alia,s2 aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) of the
1934 Act2" and SEC rule 10b-5,24 and sought permanent injunc-
tive relief pursuant to section 21(d) of the 1934 Act.25
The district court determined that Aaron's managerial role
in the company subjected him to liability under the securities
law.28 Moreover, the court found that Aaron "intentionally failed
to terminate the false and misleading statements made by
Schreiber and Jacobson, knowing them to be fraudulent. '2 7
Thus, according to the court, Aaron had acted with scienter."
However, the district court concluded that in this circuit the
SEC need not establish scienter in order to enjoin Aaron from
2Aaron was also charged with violating and aiding and abetting violations of §
17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), and the registration provisions of the
1933 Act, §§ 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976), and 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976). See
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. Snc. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,680-81.
23 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,680.
Id. at 91,681. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
15 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), quoted in relevant part in note 4 supra.
11 The district court found, notwithstanding Aaron's lack of an official title at Aaron
& Co., that Aaron's "active participation in the management of the firm" made him re-
sponsible for the fraudulent conduct of the firm's employees. [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,684.
In deciding that the absence of a corporate title is not a factor to be considered in
determining liability, the district court relied on Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1969). In Gross, a vice-president of a brokerage firm who participated in the hiring,
training and supervision of sales employees was held liable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and § 17(a) of the 1933 Act for aiding and abetting the actions of the firm's employees.
418 F.2d at 107. In finding Gross liable as an aider and abettor, the court focused on the
defendant's "participation in the management of the firm," not on his status as a corpo-
rate officer. Id. The Aaron court employed similar reasoning.
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685.
"Id. In this connection, Judge Gagliardi noted that Aaron's knowledge of the fal-
sity of the statements and his willful failure to terminate them sufficed to establish his
scienter. For a discussion of scienter, see note 7 supra.
(Vol. 46: 10711076
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engaging in security transactions.29
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Aaron claimed that the district court erred in
imposing liability on him for the acts of others and in holding
that negligence alone would suffice as a basis for a permanent
injunction. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court in all
respects.30 Significantly, although the district court noted that
Aaron's conduct may have established his scienter under the se-
curities laws,3 1 the Second Circuit refused to review this find-
ing, 2 but instead, took the opportunity to reassert its rule that
negligence is sufficient to support the granting of injunctive re-
lief in SEC enforcement actions under section 10(b)." Moreover,
this reaflirmation was announced at a time when the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder3" had generated confusion in the federal courts in
the area.
The question whether proof of scienter is necessary to es-
tablish liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act had been a
source of controversy in the federal securities law long before
Hochfelder.5 Prior to Hochfelder the various circuit courts ap-
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685 (citing SEC v. Uni-
versal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Homana v.
SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir.
1976)).
" SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 227 (1979).
31 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
605 F.2d at 619.
33 Id. See note 11 supra.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Section 10(b) generates a significant number of suits because it applies to many
types of wrongful conduct. See generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L.
REv. 562 (1972).
The controversy regarding the defendant's state of mind in private damage actions
was a thorny problem prior to Hochfelder. Compare Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1238 (8th Cir.) (negligence sufficient), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967) (proof of scienter not required), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (knowledge
not required); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (negli-
gence sufficient) with Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (some-
thing more than mere negligence is required); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th
Cir. 1974) (allegation of scienter required), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (demonstration of intent), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.
1973) (knowing or reckless conduct required), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Ci. 1973) (willful or reckless disregard for the truth re-
1980]
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plied two divergent standards with respect to the requisite
mental state of the defendant in SEC enforcement actions for
injunctive relief. 6 The majority view was that negligence was
sufficient to constitute a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
in an injunction action. Courts subscribing to this view relied on
the approach taken by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc.87 and the Second Circuit's decision
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.35
In Capital Gains, the SEC brought a preliminary injunction
action against registered investment advisers for violations of
section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.-9 The de-
fendants had failed to make full and adequate disclosure to their
clients, and thereby violated section 206(2), which statutorily
prohibits any practice that "operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client or prospective client."'40 Both the district41 and circuit
quired); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill and Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (allega-
tion of scienter, intent to defraud or reckless disregard for the truth required); Globus v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1969) (mere negligence insuffi-
cient), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913-14 (2d Cir.
1968) (actual knowledge of the fraud satisfies the scienter requirement), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969). However, Hochfelder ended this controversy by holding that an allega-
tion of negligence is insufficient to support liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 425
U.S. at 210.
Compare cases holding that negligence is sufficient, SEC v. Management Dynam-
ics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp.,
452 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) with those
requiring scienter, SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. Glass Marine Indus., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 727, 740 (D. Del. 1962).
- 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
- 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. noam. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976). Section 206(2) states:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.
Id. Compare the language of § 206(2) with that of rule 10b-5 and § 17(a). See note 24
supra for full text of rule 10b-5. See note 63 infra for full text of § 17(a).
40 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976). See 375 U.S. at 181-82 n.2.
41 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), affd en banc, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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courts,42 construing the statute's language, reasoned that the
words "fraud" and "deceit" required a showing of intent to
prove a violation. The Supreme Court, granting certiorari be--
cause of the statute's importance to the investing public and
financial community, reversed the decision of the lower courts."
In determining the necessary standard of liability, the Court
focused on the legislative history and purpose of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. The Court reasoned that, because the Act
was designed to protect investors, "[i]t would defeat the mani-
fest purpose of the [Act]" to require "proof of intent to injure
and actual injury to clients." The Court resolved the apparent
conflict between the requirement of intent for common law
fraud45 and its holding that negligence was sufficient by distin-
guishing between private damage suits and actions seeking in-
junctive relief.46 Private damage suits vindicate individual rights
under the securities laws insofar as individual plaintiffs seek
monetary relief.47  By contrast, SEC injunctive actions are
42 306 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc), reo'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
43 375 U.S. at 185.
" Id. at 192.
4 "See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.. 758
(1937); Lambert v. Smith, 235 Md. 284, 201 A.2d 491 (1964); Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 926, 245 P.2d 532 (1952); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N.Y. 124, 41 N.E. 414 (1895).
46 375 U.S. at 193-95. The Court noted that the content of common law fraud has
varied "with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship between the parties, and the
merchandise in issue." Id. at 193. Specifically, the Court relied upon the different inter-
pretation given to "fraud" in equity than that given at law in concluding that intent to
deceive is not a necessary element in an injunctive proceeding. Id. (quoting H. HArMURY,
MODRN Equrr 643 (8th ed. 1962) and W. DEFuN.Ax, HANDBOOK OF MoDRN EqurrTy 235
(2d ed. 1965)). Moreover, the Court supported its finding by distinguishing between the
two types of actions. The Court found that private damage actions are usually suits seek-
ing monetary relief involving parties to "arm's.length transactions" concerning "land
and ordinary chattels," while injunction actions are proceedings in which equitable relief
is sought against a fiduciary for a breach of his affirmative duty to give "full and fair
disclosure of all material facts" in transactions involving the sale of advice and securities.
375 U.S. at 194. See also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1090 (2d Cir. 1972); Globus v. Law Rezearch
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring),
cert. denied sub. nor. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1270
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1243 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), afl'd on different grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4 375 US. at 193. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978); Abra-
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brought for the purpose of protecting the investing public
against harm.4 8 The essential nature of the injunctive suit is eq-
uitable. 9 Because injunction actions are "mild prophylactic[s],"
a negligent violation warrants a court-ordered injunction against
the violator.5 0 Thus, the Court concluded, "Congress intended
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other
securities [antifraud] legislation. . ., not technically and restric-
tively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." 1
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,52 the Second Circuit
applied the policy considerations enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Capital Gains, and determined that in SEC proceed-
ings for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in-
hamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 875 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied sub. noam. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046,
1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
48 375 U.S. at 193.
" Id. See also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. World Radio Mis-
sion, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d
Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972);
Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Paro, 468
F. Supp. 635, 647-48 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
375 U.S. at 192-93.
81 Id. at 195. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566
F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044,
1046 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Spilkor
v. Shayne Labs., Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1975); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. &
G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
SEC v. Barraco, 438 F.2d 97, 98-99 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186
(7th Cir. 1966); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 646 (N.D.N.Y. 1979), SEC v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 828 (E.D. Wis. 1978). But see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976), where the Court stated that "[a]scertainment of
congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular sec-
tion of the [securities] Acts must ... rest primarily on the language of that section."
This standard necessarily limits the ability of future courts to apply a flexible approach.
See text accompanying notes 74-77 infra.
52 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
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tent is not a necessary element.53 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
SEC, pursuant to its authority under section 21(d) of the 1934
Act, sought to enjoin various defendants from violating section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. 5 The court reasoned that since Congress
designed section 10(b) "to prevent inequitable and unfair prac-
tices and to insure fairness in securities transactions gener-
ally,"' 8 the remedial purposes of the statute would be frustrated
if proof of specific intent to defraud were necessary to establish
a cause of action.5 7 The Second Circuit also reasoned that since
injunctive suits were brought for the protection of the investing
public, a modification of the scienter standard was justified."
According to the court, Congress did not intend "to deny [the
SEC's injunctive] power whose use in appropriate cases can be
of such great public benefit and do so little harm to legitimate
activity."5 9 Finally, the court concluded that in an injunctive ac-
tion a negligence standard would permit the SEC to achieve the
desirable end of "uniformity of enforcement" of the securities
laws.60
In contrast to the Capital Gains and Texas Gulf Sulphur
Id. at 854-55 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
193 (1963)).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), quoted in note 4 supra.
5 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Commission brought an injunction action under §
10(b) and rule 10b-5 against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS) and several of its of-
ficers and directors, charging that the defendants had either personally or through agents
purchased TGS stock on the basis of inside information, while such information re-
mained undisclosed to the public. 401 F.2d at 839-40. On this issue the court held that
anyone in possession of material inside information has a duty to disclose this informa-
tion to the public before he can trade in or recommend the securities for purchase. Id. at
848.
Id. at 847-48.
,7 Id. at 854-55. The Second Circuit also recognized the distinction enunciated in
Capital Gains contrasting private actions with SEC injunction suits, and stated that the
differences between the two types of actions warranted different standards of liability.
Id. at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 44-50 and note 46
supra.
" 401 F.2d at 854-55.
11 Id. at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 855. See also SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d
Cir. 1975); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum Ltd.,
489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1032,
1096 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., 452 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1971);
Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046,
1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). It should be noted that the articulation of a scienter standard
would have resulted in uniform enforcement of the securities laws.
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approach, a minority of circuits have adopted a standard of in-
tentional culpability in SEC injunctive suits."' SEC v. Coffey,62 a
Sixth Circuit case, is typical of those cases holding that a show-
ing of intent is required. In Coffey, the SEC sought to enjoin the
board chairman (John King) and the financial vice-president
(William Coffey) from misrepresenting the financial condition of
the corporation in violation of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act"
and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.64 In establishing the criteria
61 See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974) (fraud or deceit re-
quires a superior knowledge of one party over another), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
SEC v. Glass Marine Indis., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 727, 740 (D. Del. 1962) ("intent is essen-
tial to a scheme to defraud"). After the Supreme Court's holding in Hochfelder the Fifth
Circuit and several district courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits joined the minority. See cases cited in note 84 infra.
42 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. In SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979), the
Second Circuit, employing the analysis of the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, concluded
that neither the language of § 17(a) nor its legislative history require that liability be
predicated on a showing of scienter in SEC injunctive proceedings. Id. at 1026-27. The
court noted that the language of subsection (2) of § 17(a) does not predicate liability on
fraudulent intent and that the phrase in subsection (3), "operates as a fraud," empha-
sizes the "effect of potentially misleading conduct on the public, not.., the culpability
of the person responsible." Id. at 1026 (emphasis in original). Moreover, in support of its
conclusion that negligence suffices in § 17(a) enforcement actions, the court relied on
Justice Douglas's statement that § 17 makes unlawful "even innocent acts to obtain
money or property by means of untrue statements of material facts or omissions to state
material facts." Id. at 1027 (quoting Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181 (1933)).
Other courts addressing this issue have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., SEC
v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. World Radio
Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1313, 1315
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. Southwest Coal and Energy
Co., 439 F. Supp. 820, 826 (W.D.La. 1977); SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fan.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726
(N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1979). But see SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 199-200 (N.D. IM. 1977) (scienter
required in a § 17(a) enforcement proceeding).
" See 493 F.2d at 1308.
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for liability under section 10(b), the court stated that the SEC
must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the undisclosed
facts about the corporation and the materiality of the omitted
information.6" Eschewing the policy considerations relied on by
the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Sixth Circuit
based its holding primarily on the language of the statute be-
cause section 10(b) prohibits "fraudulent or deceptive scheme[s]
or practice[s]."1 The court looked to the common law standard
of fraud which requires proof of the defendant's intent to de-
fraud before liability may be imposed,67 and concluded that sci-
enter is a necessary element in securities fraud as well, regard-
less of the nature of the proceeding.6 8
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,69 the Supreme Court en-
tered the controversy created by the dichotomy in the circuit
courts with respect to the mental state required to support the
imposition of liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, but
addressed the issue only in the context of a private damage ac-
tion. Hochfelder held that in a private damage action under
those provisions, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he estab-
lishes that the defendant acted with scienter. 70 The Court de-
clined, however, to address the question of the state of mind
standard to be applied in SEC enforcement actions.7 1 Thus,
while Hochfelder did not cause the controversy, its silence on
the question of the mental state required in enforcement actions
exacerbated an already intense debate.72 Hochfelder did, how-
"Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1311.
7Id. at 1313. See note 45 supra.
Id. Although the Coffey court did not state specifically that scienter is required,
the decision is rife with discussion of knowledge. Thus, the scienter requirement is im-
plicit in the court's holding.
el 425 US. 185 (1976).
70 Id. at 193. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 8 supra.
For a general discussion of the impact of Hochfelder, see Berner and Franklin,
Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A
Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769 (1976); Bucklo, The Supreme
Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
STAN. L. Rav. 213 (1977); Hampson, Accountants' Liability-The Significance of
Hochfelder, J. OF AccouNT. 69 (Dec. 1976); Parker, Attorney Liability Under the Secur-
ities Laws After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 Loy. oF L.A. L. REv. 521 (1977); Note,
The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 CoLuM. L. Rav. 419 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scienter Re-
quirement]; Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An Analysis
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ever, have the effect of setting the course lower courts are to
follow in construing the securities laws, particularly section
10(b) .7
In analyzing section 10(b) the Supreme Court in Hochfelder
focused on the language of the section, 4 the legislative intent,7
and the overall enforcement scheme of the securities laws. 0
First, the Court found that the use of the words "manipulative
or deceptive" in conjunction with "device or contrivance" limit
the section's application to conduct that is knowing or inten-
tional.7 The Court then considered the legislative history of the
1934 Act. While the congressional reports did not disclose an ex-
plicit expression of Congress' intent, neither did the bills that
gave rise to section 10(b) indicate that the section was intended
to prohibit conduct that did not rise to the level of scienter.78 In
addition, a spokesman for the drafters described section 10(b) as
a "catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. 719 The
Court seized on the appearance of the word "manipulative" in
this context to support its conclusion that scienter is a requisite
element.8 0
Finally, the Court examined the overall enforcement scheme
in Light of Hochfelder, 52 Norae DAmus LAw. 925 (1977); Note, Recklessness Under Sec-
tion 10(b): Weathering the Hochfelder Storm, 8 Rur.-CAm. L. J. 325 (1977).
73 425 U.S. at 214. See text accompanying notes 74-85 infra.
74 Id. at 197-201.
1 Id. at 206-11. Although the Supreme Court recognized that it must focus prima-
rily on the language of § 10(b) in determining the congressional intent with respect to
the standard of liability, it nevertheless turned to the legislative history of the 1934 Act
for further support of its holding that the language of that section specifically prohibits
intentional wrongdoing. Id. at 200-01. The Court found that portions of the legislative
history of the 1934 Act revealed that Congress intended to impose liability under § 10(b)
only "where the defendant has not acted in good faith." Id. at 206.
11 Id. at 206-11. Recognizing that it had stated in SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 466 (1969), that "the interdependence of the various sections in the securities
laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has
chosen," the Hochfelder Court addressed the SEC's contention that, in contrast to other
sections of the securities laws, § 10(b) is not "explicitly restricted to willful, ]mowing, or
purposeful conduct." 425 U.S. at 206-07.
" 425 U.S. at 197. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of § 10(b). See notes 91-92
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Aaron court's use of this part of the
Hochfelder opinion.
78 Id. at 201-02.
19 Id. at 202 (citing Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement
of Thomas G. Corcoran)).
8o Id. at 203.
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of the 1934 Act and the interdependence of various sections of
that Act. According to the Court, other sections, particularly
those that provide for civil remedies, require either conduct be-
yond negligence or "significant procedural restrictions not appli-
cable to § 10(b)." 1 The Court reasoned therefrom that a negli-
gence standard for section 10(b) would serve to undercut the
requirements imposed by Congress on other civil liability sec-
tions."2 Thus, the Court determined that scienter is a necessary
element of liability in private damage actions under section
10(b)."
Because Hochfelder declined to extend its mandate to SEC
injunctive suits, the circuit courts were free to continue the pre-
Hochfelder debate.8 The decision did, however, preclude mere
81 Id. at 209. See, eg., § 11(b)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976) (ex-
empting from liability any person other than the issuer with regard to portions of the
registration statement prepared by such person if he can show that he had a "reasonable
ground to believe and did believe" that the statements made were true and "that there
was no omission to state a material fact"); § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, id. § 771(2) (avoiding
seller's liability for untrue statements or the omission of necessary statements by proving
that "he did not know" or "could not have known" of the untruth or omission); § 15 of
the 1933 Act, id. § 77o (affording a controlling person, who otherwise may be held liable
with and to the same extent as the controlled person, the means to escape liability by
establishing that he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the exis-
tence of facts" upon which the liability of the controlled person is predicated); §§ 9(a),
(e) of the 1934 Act, id. §§ 78i(a), (e) (requiring knowing or willful conduct as a precondi-
tion for civil liability); § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, id. § 78r(a) (imposing liability on any
person who makes false or misleading statements in any report filed with SEC, but pro-
viding the person an escape from liability if heproves "he acted in good faith or had no
knowledge" that the statement made was false); § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, id. § 78t(a)
(imposing civil liability on a controlling person to the same extent that the controlled
person is liable for violations of the Act, but exculpating the controlling person if he
acted in good faith and did not induce the violation).
425 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 214.
34 See, e.g., Edward J. Mawood & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that scienter is an essential element in an enforcement action); SEC v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that negligence rather than
scienter is the standard for imposing liability in an enforcement proceeding); SEC v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that the Commission must prove that
the defendant acted with scienter); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-
41 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that Congress intended § 10(b) to be construed to require only
negligent conduct); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1270 (D.D.C. 1978) (concluding that
Hochfelder demands that scienter be proven in an injunctive action under § 10(b)); SEC
v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820,825 (W.D. La. 1977) (concluding that
scienter is an essential element of any claim predicated on § 10(b)); SEC v. Cenco, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. I. 1977) (finding scienter applicable to Commission injunc-
tive suits); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (re-
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discussion of policy, and mandated scrutiny of the statute
instead.85
When faced with the issue in Aaron, the Second Circuit rea-
soned that the "compelling distinctions between private damage
actions and government injunction actions"86 allowed the court
to avoid a wholesale application of the Hochfelder analysis. Re-
lying on the public policy objectives of investor protection, the
court decided that the need for effective protection for the in-
vesting public outweighed the potential danger that a broader
standard of liability would pose to the defendants.8 7 Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit determined that, despite the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Hochfelder, negligence is the appro-
priate standard of liability in SEC enforcement actions under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.as
In discussing the policy considerations underlying the secur-
ities laws,89 the Second Circuit implicitly recognized that it
quiring that scienter be proved when the SEC brings suit), aff'd on different grounds,
565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
" In addressing the scienter issue the Court specifically noted that "[t]he starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 425 U.S. at
197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 at 756 (1975) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)). The Court also found that since the language and history of § 10(b)
was dispositive with respect to the standard of liability, there was no need to examine
policy considerations. Id. at 214 n.33.
" 605 F.2d at 620. The Second Circuit specifically noted that prior to Hochfelder, it
"had construed the language of § 10(b) to require scienter in the context of private dam-
age actions," but had "uniformly ... held that the language and history of the section
[did] not require a showing of scienter in an injunction enforcement action." Id. at 620-
21. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
87 605 F.2d at 621. The court supported this position by citing SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973). In Spectrum, the SEC sought to enjoin an
attorney who prepared an opinion letter that provided the basis for a sale of unregistered
securities by his client. The Second Circuit found that, since the defendant knew his
opinion letter could be used to sell the unregistered securities, he would be held liable as
an alder and abettor. Id. at 541-42. In applying the negligence standard of culpability,
the court stated that "in a proceeding by the SEC seeking prophylactic relief, [the court]
would be undermining this salutary mechanism by an overly fine appraisal of conduct
which contributes to its circumvention." Id. at 541 n.12. However, the Spectrum court
limited its application of the negligence standard to the specific facts of the case. The
court stated that "the standard of culpability ... appropriate for the author of an opin-
ion letter in an action for injunctive relief ... should not ... apply to more peripheral
participants in an illicit scheme." Id. at 542.
" 605 F.2d at 619.
89 It should be noted that "a major congressional policy behind the securities laws in
general, and the antifraud provisions in particular, is the protection of investors who rely
on the completeness and accuracy of information made available to them." Chris-Craft
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could no longer predicate the validity of a negligence standard
solely upon the Supreme Court's holding in Capital Gains and
the policy objectives expressed in that case. Therefore, in addi-
tion to emphasizing policy, the Aaron court supported its hold-
ing with an extended analysis of statutory language and legisla-
tive history which paralleled, at least in form, the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder.90 As the Supreme
Court did in Hochfelder, the Second Circuit considered first the
language of section 10(b) itself. The panel noted that, although
the language of the statute applied to suits brought by the SEC
as well as to actions instituted by private parties, that language
had been construed differently depending on the nature of the
action and the character of the plaintiff. 1 Therefore, the lan-
guage of section 10(b), without more, did not compel adherence
to the result reached in Hochfelder in all contexts.
Because the language itself failed to provide a clear direc-
tive regarding the proper construction of the statute, the Aaron
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973), reu'd, 430 U.S. 1
(1977). See also A. BROMBURO, I SEcUmRITs LAw: FRAUD, SEC RuLE 10b-5, § 7.1, at 142-
45 (1977).
In a similar vein, Justice Goldberg, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180 (1963), noted that "[a] fundamental purpose, common to [the 1933 and
1934 Acts], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."
Id. at 186.
Specifically, the 1934 Act was aimed at protecting the investor in the securities mar-
ket by providing for regular reporting requirements and by imposing regulations that
guard against manipulation of stock prices. See S. RuP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sss. 1-5
(1934). See also HR. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
90 605 F.2d at 621.
g1 Id. See text accompanying notes 66-85 supra. The Second Circuit based its con-
clusion on the fact that there have been several conflicting judicial interpretations of the
language of § 10(b). Compare those cases interpreting the language of § 10(b) to require
only negligence, Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 852 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,855 (2d Cir. 1968) (plural-
ity opinion), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) with those cases interpreting the language as requiring
scienter, SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280
(3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
874 (1972).
It should be noted that although the Hochfelder Court left open the specific stan-
dard to be applied in enforcement actions, it found that the language of the statute was
indeed clear. 425 U.S. at 199-201.
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court consulted legislative history for further guidance.9,2 Noting
that the Supreme Court found the legislative history of section
10(b) "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent,"' ,,
the Aaron panel concentrated on the legislative history of sec-
tion 21(d) of the 1934 Act" which authorizes the SEC to seek
injunctive relief against any person who allegedly has violated
the securities laws.9 5 The discussion of section 21(d) in the Sen-
ate Report' accompanying the Securities Act Amendments of
197597 served as the object of the Aaron court's focus. In review-
92 605 F.2d at 621.
93 425 U.S. at 201. The Hochfelder Court decided that since the language of § 10(b)
was "sufficiently clear," it was essentially unnecessary to look at the legislative history of
the 1934 Act, but it did so to determine only "whether there [was] support for the mean-
ing attributed to § 10(b) by the Commission." Id. The approach taken by the Supreme
Court is consistent with the general view of the use of legislative history in determining
congressional intent. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947); Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago
B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922). Specifically, legislative history will not be "given
effect to override a clear and unambiguous meaning conveyed by the language of the
statute." C. SANDS, 2A STATUTES & CONSTRUCrON § 48.14 (4th ed. 1973). However, the
Supreme Court in United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940), while recognizing that the words of a statute are the most "persuasive evidence"
in ascertaining congressional intent, stated that when the statutory language is ambigu.
ous, the Court will look beyond the plain meaning of the words. "When aid to construc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be
no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination."' Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Re-
search Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 78-79
(1974); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943). See generally Murphy,
Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 1299 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d), quoted in part in note 4 supra. See generally H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, 10, 11 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-6
(1934). See also Scienter Requirement, supra note 72, at 429-35.
95 605 F.2d at 622.
" S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 76 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 179, 254.
17 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 154 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976)). The 1975
Amendment of § 21 of the 1934 Act exempted enforcement actions brought by the SEC
from consolidation with private damage actions. Generally, private parties would file ac-
tions involving questions similar to those of the Commission's action, and then attempt
to latch onto the government action. As a result of the consolidation, the Commission
encountered substantial delays, placing an unnecessary burden on the injured investor.
Thus, in a successful attempt to eliminate this disruptive burden, the Commission rec-
ommended legislation to exempt its enforcement actions from the operation of these ju-
dicial procedures, arguing that such an exemption would provide expeditious enforce-
ment of the securities laws, a vital element in the protection of security investors. S. REP.
No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD.
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ing the nature of SEC enforcement actions, the Senate Report
noted the distinction between such actions and private damage
suits: a private damage action may require determination of is-
sues "such as scienter, causation and extent of damages,""" but
these elements are not necessarily required in a Commission in-
junctive action. The Aaron court found this expression suffi-
ciently clear to serve as the basis for its conclusion that Congress
intended to "exempt SEC injunction actions from the scienter
requirement."99 It should be noted, however, that while the lan-
guage of the Senate Report indicates that proof of scienter is not
a prerequisite for the granting of an injunction against a viola-
tor, section 21(d) only authorizes the suit to be brought; it does
not purport to articulate what constitutes a violation.100 More-
over, the Senate Report predated Hochfelder, and therefore con-
tains no reference to the Supreme Court's analysis of section
10(b) violations. Thus, the Report is of limited value as support
for a negligence standard.101
After reviewing the statutory language and legislative his-
tory of section 10(b), the Second Circuit observed that the use of
a negligence standard for enforcement suits under section 10(b)
would not eliminate as enforcement vehicles "comparable provi-
sions" of the securities laws. 0 2 The court noted that other sec-
tions permitting injunctive suits for similar violations do not ex-
plicitly require scienter.103 Reasoning that the conflict between
various sections, raised in Hochfelder,10 did not exist in Aaron,
the court determined that recognizing a negligence standard
under section 10(b) would not circumvent any other securities
laws. 0 5
According to the court's reasoning, the difference between
Naws 179, 251-56.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODF
CONG. & AD. N.ws 179, 254.
" 605 F.2d at 622.
100 See note 4 supra.
1o See note 109 and accompanying text infra.
605 F.2d at 623. When the court spoke of "comparable provisions", it was re-
ferring to § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976), § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, id. §
771(2), and § 15 of the 1933 Act, id. § 77o (1976). For a discussion of these sections see
note 81 and accompanying text supra.
10- 605 F.2d at 622 n.14.
104 See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
105 605 F.2d at 623.
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private damage actions and government enforcement actions
permitted it to avoid the Hochfelder result, although not its ra-
tionale. The court's analysis, however, demonstrates that exami-
nation of the language, legislative history and overall enforce-
ment scheme disclosed nothing to proscribe the application of a
negligence standard. The court tipped the balance in favor of
negligence by considering policy, a factor which the Hochfelder
Court refused to consider.
106
While the Second Circuit expressly accepted the district
court's "adequate findings of fact, 1 07 it declined to consider
whether Aaron's conduct did indeed rise to the level of scien-
ter.10 This equivocal aspect of the opinion leaves unclear the
precise view of Aaron's conduct adopted by the circuit court. It
does highlight, however, that the court's announcement of negli-
gence as a sufficient predicate for SEC injunctive suits was
unnecessary.109
106 See note 85 and text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
In deciding that policy considerations should govern in an enforcement action, the
Aaron court relied on SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
950 (1979). The defendant in Coven, a securities lawyer, was retained for the purpose of
effectuating a public offering of certain securities. In accordance with his agreement, the
defendant hired two firms to underwrite the proposed issue. The basis of the action arose
when the underwriters failed to comply with the terms of the offering and began to ma-
nipulate the price of the stock in customers' transactions. See id. at 1022. Subsequently,
the SEC instituted an injunction action charging the defendant with violating § 17(a) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), quoted in note 63 supra. See 581 F.2d at 1021.
In applying negligence as the standard of culpability under § 17(a), the Coven court
focused on the underlying policy considerations of SEC enforcement actions as enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963). See 581 F.2d at 1027-28.
107 605 F.2d at 614.
108 Id. at 619.
109 Traditionally, a court can grant a permanent injunction when it appears that the
defendant is likely to repeat the violation. See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs.,
Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978); SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 812-13 (2d Cir.
1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Universal
Major Indus., Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Homans v.
SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807-08 (2d
Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Culpeppr, 270 F.2d 241, 249
(2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. National Student Mktg., Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D.D.C.
1978). Proof of a past violation does not by itself justify injunctive relief, see SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975). It may, however, give rise
to an inference of future misconduct when combined with other factors. Id. See SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Culpepper, 270
F.2d 241, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.R.I.
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The opinion is vulnerable to criticism on another ground, as
well. The SEC's complaint charged, and the district court found,
that Aaron had violated and aided and abetted violations of the
securities laws.110 The Second Circuit specifically held that be-
cause of his "participation in the management of the firm and
his supervisory responsibilities... Aaron [had] aided and abet-
ted the violations by the firm's salesmen.""' The circuit court's
opinion, however, failed to apply an aiding and abetting analysis
to the facts.1"2 Thus, in simultaneously announcing a negligence
1973). Some of the other factors that are relevant in determining whether an injunction
should issue include:
the fact that defendant has been found liable for illegal conduct; the degree of
scienter involved; whether the infraction is an "isolated occurrence"; whether
defendant continues to maintain that his past conduct was blameless; and
whether, because of his professional occupation, the defendant might be in a
position where future violations could be anticipated.
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting SEC
v. Management Dynamics, Inc. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,229, at 98,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). The ultimate question is "whether the defendant's
past conduct indicates-under all the circumstances . . .- that there is a reasonable
likelihood of further violations in the future." L. Loss, I SEcuurrs REGAtu ON 1976
(2d ed. 1961). As was noted by Justice Rehnquist at oral agrument in Aaron v. SEC, the
Commission would be bard pressed to make a demonstration that the defendant is likely
to violate the law again when the defendant is merely negligent. 48 U.S.L.W. 3564 (Mar.
4, 1980). Although the Commission may be authorized to seek an injunction based upon
negligent conduct, the grant of such an injunction requires a greater showing of culpabil-
ity. This apparent conflict further undermines the appropriateness of not only a negli-
gence standard but also the Aaron court's reliance on § 21(d) to support that standard.
110 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FE. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,685. The district court
found that Aaron was aware that the firm's registered representatives were making false
and misleading statements in connection with the market-making activities for the LAM
stock. Id. at 91,684. Additionally, the district court found that since Aaron functioned in
a managerial capacity, his failure to terminate the false and misleading statements was
sufficient to establish his scienter and make him liable as an aider and abettor under §
10(b). Id. at 91,685.
1 605 F.2d at 617. See also note 26 supra.
11 Aiding and abetting liability has been recognized in securities fraud cases since
SEC v. Timetrust Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939). The origins of aiding and
abetting liability are found in both tort and criminal law concepts.
Many courts have relied on the tort law principles governing aider and abettor lia-
bility to impose liability in the securities fraud context. The Restatement of Torts
provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or
pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the
other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately con-
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standard and imposing aiding and abetting liability on Aaron,
the court provided an opportunity for an unwarranted departure
from prior case law in this area.
Traditionally, the imposition of liability for aiding and abet-
ting is dependent on the satisfaction of three elements of the
cause of action.11 It must be shown first, that some other
party-the principal wrongdoer-has committed an independent
wrong;"" second, that the alleged aider and abettor has knowl-
edge of the independent wrong;115 and third, that the alleged
aider and abettor has substantially assisted the independent
wrong. Although these elements derive from principles of tort
sidered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). For cases that have invoked the tort law
principle as a source of liability for alders and abettors, see Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676-80 (N.D. Ind.
1966), af'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
Similarly, the criminal law imposes liability on one who assists the wrongful conduct
of another. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides: "[w]hoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, Is
punishable as a principal." See Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); SEC v. Timetrust Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939). The Su-
preme Court in Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949), stated that "[i]n
order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in some
sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, [and] that he seek by his action to make it succeed."' Id. at 619
(quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
M13 See generally A. BROMBRG, SECURrrms LAW: FRAUD, § 8.5, at 1 530 (1975);
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, in Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution 120 U. PA. L. Rev. 597, 628-
41 (1972).
M See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 871-72 n.16
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84,
94-95, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975). See Ruder, supra note 113, at 628.
x1 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316-17 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1977). See A.
BROMBERG, supra note 113, § 8.5, at 1 582; Ruder, supra note 113, at 630.
"' See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th
Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316-17 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974). See A. BROMBERG, supra note 113, § 8.5, at 530; Ruder, supra note 113, at 639.
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and criminal liability, they have been applied as well to viola-
tions of the securities laws. 1
In aiding and abetting cases, courts have recognized that
knowledge of the wrongful act and awareness of the party's role
in the accomplishment of the wrong are crucial to liability.1 18
The courts' articulation of these elements, however, may vary by
requiring either knowledge of the fraud or knowing substantial
assistance, or both.119 For example, in SEC v. Coffey,120 the con-
duct of the primary wrongdoers consisted of alleged misrepre-
sentations and omissions of material facts concerning the
financial condition of an Ohio corporation. As a result of their
alleged wrongdoing, the state of Ohio purchased certain notes
from their corporation and suffered financial loss. Defendant
Coffey's participation consisted of discussing the terms of the
Ohio transaction with a member of the "money-finder" firm that
arranged the purchase of the notes.1 2' The Sixth Circuit held
that liability for aiding and abetting could be imposed on Coffey
if the SEC could establish that he was aware that an "actionable
fraud was being perpetrated on the State of Ohio. 11 22 A logical
interpretation of the court's statement compels the conclusion
that the court deemed it appropriate to impose aiding and abet-
ting liability upon a showing of knowledge of the wrong coupled
with substantial assistance.1 23
In contrast to, although not inconsistent with, the Coffey
holding, the Fifth Circuit, in Woodward v. Metro Bank1 2' em-
117 See note 113 supra.
See notes 115-16 supra. See text accompanying notes 120-50 infra.
, See note 143 and text accompanying notes 120-32 infra.
-0 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 US. 908 (1975).
11 See id. at 1308.
Id. at 1319.
11 In addressing the aiding and abetting issue, the Coffey court set forth a three-tier
analysis. In order to impose secondary liability there must first be an independent secur-
ities law violation committed by a party other than the aider and abettor. Id. at 1316. In
this regard, the court found the element satisfied by the omission of material facts by the
"money-finder" in his dealings with the Ohio officials. The court then focused on
whether Coffey was aware of his role in the fraudulent scheme. Here the circuit court
directed the district court's attention to the circumstances surrounding Coffey's discus-
sion of the terms of the Ohio transaction with the "money-finder." Id. It should be noted
that the court considered the knowledge requirement to be the crucial element in estab-
lishing aiding and abetting liability, for it proceeded to require that the aider-abettor
knowingly render substantial assistance to the principal wrongdoer. Id. at 1316-17.
u 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
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phasized the defendant's knowing substantial assistance.12 In
Woodward, the defendant bank allegedly aided and abetted a
securities fraud perpetrated by one of its customers (E.T.
Starnes).28 Starnes had induced the plaintiff to execute secur-
ity agreements and pledge collateral in support of a loan from
the bank to him personally and his corporation.127 At the time of
the transaction, however, the bank failed to disclose to the
plaintiff facts regarding the corporation which might have indi-
cated its financial instability.1 28 In determining the defendant's
liability, the court found that the ordinary nature of the busi-
ness transaction and the absence of any direct duty to the plain-
tiff on the part of the bank precluded the imposition of liability
" Id. at 95-97. The court stated that "[a] remote party must not only be aware of
his role, but he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering the fraud."
Id. at 95.
In deciding that the aider and abettor must be found to have rendered the assis-
tance knowingly, the Woodward court cited to Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). In Landy, the court found that the existence of
an independent wrong, knowledge of that wrong and substantial assistance in the wrong
were all necessary elements in establishing aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 162-63.
Examination of these elements by the Woodward court revealed that since the substan-
tial assistance aspect of aiding and abetting liability demonstrates that it is the partici-
pation in the fraudulent scheme which is at issue, the key to liability must lie in the
aider and abettor's knowledge of his role in the overall scheme. 522 F.2d at 95-96. The
Woodward court noted that "[olne could [potentially] know of the existence of a 'wrong'
without being aware of his role in the scheme." Id. at 95. Thus, the Woodward panel
found that the absence of the "knowing" substantial assistance element of the Landy
test created room for overinclusiveness. Id. It was the apparent need to safeguard against
the imposition of liability for totally innocent conduct that compelled the Woodward
court to establish restraints on aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 97.
The comments to § 876 of the Second Restatement of Torts set forth several criteria
to be used in determining whether the participation by the defendant is substantial
enough to find that an individual is liable for the misconduct of another. The factors to
be considered are: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount of assistance
rendered by the defendant; (3) the presence or absence of the defendant at the time of
the tort; (4) the defendant's relation to the other person; and (5) the state of mind of the
defendant. RESTATEMENT (S~cOND) OF TORTS § 876, comment to clause (b) (1979). The
"state of mind" criterion suggests that "substantial assistance" implies knowledge of the
independent wrong.
Moreover, as illustrated in Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949), the Supreme Court's application of aiding and abetting liability in the criminal
area harmonizes with the Restatement's state of mind criterion. See note 112 supra.
120 522 F.2d at 89.
See id. at 88.
128 See id. at 88-89. The court noted that the defendant bank was not aware of its
customer's "dismal" financial situation. Id. at 88 n.10.
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on the bank.129 The court reasoned that since the imposition of
aiding and abetting liability is contingent upon a finding of par-
ticipation, that participation should be knowing. °30 Here, there
was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the bank's
assistance was rendered knowingly."'
Although the Woodward court apparently eliminated the
requirement of knowledge of the independent wrong, it is clear
that knowing substantial assistance necessarily requires that the
2" Id. at 98-99. The Woodward court emphasized that the defendant's behavior as
consistent with the duties imposed by state law and that the bank's loan transactions
with the primary wrongdoer were confidential. Therefore, there was no duty on the part
of the bank to disclose such information to the plaintiff. Id. at 99.
The origin of aiding and abetting liability for mere silence and inaction can be found
in Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (NJ). Ind.
1966), afl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See Kerba v.
Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 413, 419 (D. Or. 1973). It appears, though, that liability for silence and inaction
arises only "when there is a duty of disclosure owed to the plaintiff." Stem v. American
Bankahares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1977). See, eg., Steadman v. SEC.
603 F.2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sees. Clearance
Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161-62 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289,
1303-04, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); Wessel
v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324
F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), afld, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally A.
BROMBERG, supra note 113 § 8.5, at 533; Ruder, supra note 113, at 643-44. The alleged
aider and abettor must be shown to have possessed "knowledge of or, but for a breach of
duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such
knowledge the party failed to act due to . .. [a] breach of a duty of disclosure."
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 Us.
875 (1974). Thus, it appears that the courts effectively have limited aiding and abetting
liability for mere silence or inaction to situations where the alleged aider and abettor has
knowledge of the fraud or can be deemed to have such knowledge and has failed to
disclose the primary wrong in breach of his duty to make disclosure.
130 522 F.2d at 95.
I Id. at 99-100. In applying the final requirement for aiding and abetting liability,
the court focused on the nature of the assistance rendered and the duty owed by the
alleged aider and abettor. The court noted that where there is some type of affirmative
assistance in conjunction with silence or inaction, the "degree of knowledge required [to
impose aiding and abetting liability depends] on how ordinary the assisting activity is in
the business involved." Id. at 97 (footnote omitted). Thus, if the alleged aider and abet-
tor can show that his actions were consistent with normal business practices, he may be
held liable only upon proof of a specific intent to violate the securities laws. However,
the knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability may be inferred if the activity




actor have knowledge of the independent wrong.13s Conversely,
an actor who has knowledge of the independent wrong may be
deemed, by inference, to have acted knowingly in rendering sub-
stantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer. As a result, the
two statements in Coffey and Woodward indicate differences
merely in emphasis rather than in substance.
In addition to the formalistic variations with respect to
which element demands a showing of knowledge, there remains
a question as to what level of knowledge is sufficient for the im-
position of aiding and abetting liability."" Some courts have in-
dicated a willingness to impose aiding and abetting liability on
the basis of a showing of less than actual knowledge. The Wood-
ward court, in its discussion of the defendant's general aware-
ness of his role in the improper scheme, stated that knowledge
1' See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
'3 See, e.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Secs. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,
485 (2d Cir. 1979) ("something closer to an actual intent to aid in a fraud, at least in the
absence of some special relationship with the plaintiff that is fiduciary in nature" is re-
quired); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (ac-
tual knowledge is required, but "knowledge may be less strict where the alleged aider
and abettor derives benefits from the wrongdoing") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1978); Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977) ("knowledge of the
fraud, and not merely the undisclosed material facts, is indispensable"); Gould v. Amerl-
can-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976) ("where the alleged aider and
abettor derives benefits from wrongdoing. . . the proof offered must establish conscious
involvement in impropriety or constructive notice of intended impropriety") (citation
omitted); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975) ("liability for
aiding and abetting may be found on less than actual knowledge of the illegal activity
[but] how much or how little knowledge [varies] with the facts of each case"); Woodward
v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[k]nowledge may be shown by circum-
stantial evidence, or by reckless conduct, but the proof must demonstrate actual aware-
ness of the party's role in the fraudulent scheme"); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch.,
503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.) ("the party charged with aiding and abetting [must have
actual] knowledge of or, but for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have [known] of the
fraud"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir.
1974) (a "general awareness [on the part of the aider-abettor] that his role was part of an
overall activity that is improper" satisfies the knowledge requirement), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973) (an allegation that "the
brokerage firms knew from the volume of trading, the improper manner in which the
account was handled . . . and from personal and direct knowledge of the affairs of the
bank, 'that [the] accounts were part of a device and scheme to defraud'" may not be
"sufficient to fulfill the knowledge requirement"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1969) (the de-
fendants "knew. . . that Dobich. . . had made a number of misrepresentations"), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins., Co., 324 F. Supp. 189,
195 (N.D. Tex.) ("knowledge may be actual or constructive"), afl'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th
Cir. 1971). See Ruder, supra note 113, at 638.
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may be shown by reckless conduct.1 34 Similarly, the Northern
District of Texas, in SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 235 a
case involving stock manipulation, announced that knowledge of
the fraudulent act may be either actual or constructive.30
The apparent flexibility with which the courts have dealt
with the question of the requisite level of knowledge for aiding
and abetting liability may, however, be misleading. While the
Woodward court indicated willingness to accept reckless con-
duct, it demanded in addition a showing of the defendant's "ac-
tual awareness of [its] role in the fraudulent scheme."3  This
equivocation is paralleled by the National Bankers court's re-
quirement that the defendants have a "general awareness that
any acts . . . committed were necessary to the furtherance of
[the] improper [scheme]."'"- Although the court noted that con-
structive knowledge would suffice, 3 the quoted statement is in-
consistent with constructive knowledge." 04
While there is a lack of unanimity regarding which of the
latter two elements of the cause of action for aiding and abetting
gives rise to the requirement that the defendant have
14 522 F.2d at 96. See, e.g., Roll v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38,
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Stem v. American Bankshares Corp., 429
F. Supp. 818, 826 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
Reckless conduct has been defined as "an act of an unreasonable character in disre-
gard of a risk known to [the actor] or so obvious that he must be taken to have been
aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow." W.
PRossER, supra note 7, § 34, at 185. For cases following this definition in the securities
law context, see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44-45 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Saunders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790,
793 (7th Cir. 1977); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973). See
also Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round:- Privity and State of Mind in Rule
10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 436 (1968).
324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), arfd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 195; see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir.
1976); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135,
144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Constructive knowledge has been defined as "what a person should know as opposed
to what he does know," and as "knowledge of facts stimulating inquiry and... failure
to perform a duty of acquiring information." A. BRouao, supra note 113, § 8.4, at 1
531 (citation omitted).
13 522 F.2d at 96.
" 324 F. Supp. at 197 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 195.
110 See note 136 supra.
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knowledge,14 1 and a lack of certainty with respect to what mini-
mal level of knowledge is required,4 2 there is no question that
some knowledge on the part of the defendant must be shown
before liability for aiding and abetting may be imposed. 48 The
knowledge requirement serves a useful purpose by ensuring that
an innocent party who "unwittingly facilitate[s] the wrongful
acts of another" will not be liable for the consequences of that
wrong.1
44
The knowledge requirement is particularly important in the
securities field. For example, in the absence of such a require-
ment, a broker who merely executes a sell order for a customer
would be held liable for the resulting damage if the transaction
were fraudulently induced by the purchaser. In addition to of-
fending ordinary notions of fairness, the imposition of liability
in such circumstances upon anyone who sells securities would
impose an undue, as well as an unreasonable, burden of investi-
gation, which, in turn, would pose a threat to the continued via-
bility of the securities industry.
1" See text accompanying notesa 119-32 supra.
142 See note 133 supra.
"I See, e.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Secs. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,
483-85 (2d Cir. 1979); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 799,
801-02 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 759
(2d Cir. 1977); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1976);
Rochez Bros., Inc., v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Woodward v. Metro
Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 603 F.2d
364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493,F.2d 1304, 1316
(6th Cir. 1974),' cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63
(3d Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th
Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins., Co., 417 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cr.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Butterman v. Walston & Co., 387 F.2d 822, 824-
25 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); In re GAP Stores Secs. Litigation,
457 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Secs.
Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 56
(E.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Cooper, 402 F. Supp. 516, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Na-
tional Bankers Life Ins., Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), afl'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th
Cir. 1971); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pettit v. American
Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478
(E.D. Pa. 1947); A. BROMBERG, supra note 113, § 8.5, at 1 582; Ruder, supra note 113, at
630. But see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert, de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), discussed in notes 145-50 and accompanying text infra; Stern
v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
144 Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 875 (1974). See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (6th Cir. 1976);
Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1977); A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 113, § 8.5, at 582; Ruder, supra note 113, at 630-31.
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In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,"' a case decided
the term preceeding Aaron, the Second Circuit appeared to have
extended the existing limits of aiding and abetting liability while
keeping intact the policy behind the knowledge requirement." '
The Rolf court imposed aiding and abetting liability on a fiduci-
ary whose reckless conduct substantially assisted the fraud per-
petrated on the plaintiff by his investment advisor. 147 Although
there was no showing that the defendant had actual knowledge
of the fraud, the court found the defendant liable, essentially
charging him with the knowledge he would have gained had he
not breached his fiduciary duty by recklessly failing to investi-
gate."48 While this analysis does not mesh with prior aiding and
abetting cases,149 arguably it is not totally inconsistent with
those cases because the predicate for liability in Rolf was the
defendant's culpable conduct which rose to the level of scien-
145 70 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
146 Id. at 46 n.15. The Rolf court found that reckless behavior as opposed to know-
ing conduct may he sufficient to impose liability for aiding and abetting while recogniz-
ing the strong policy against imposing liability for "wholly faultless conduct." Id. (quot-
ing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976)). Because Hochfelder held that
§ 10(b) could not be extended to illicit activities where the defendant had acted in good
faith, the Second Circuit reasoned that the adoption of a recklessness standard would
not frustrate the policy of avoiding overinclusiveness, since reckless conduct could not be
interpreted as coming within the ambit of good faith. Id. See text accompanying note
148 infra.
147 Id. at 48.
148 Id. at 47. In addressing the knowledge requirement for establishing aiding and
abetting liability, the Rolf court stated that where the alleged aider and abettor owes a
fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, proof of reckless conduct will satisfy the scienter
requirement. Id. at 44, 47. In light of the traditional interpretation given to reckless
conduct, see note 134 supra, the Roll court's adoption of a recklessness standard for
aiding and abetting liability appears to eliminate any requirement that the aider and
abettor have knowledge of the wrong or that he be aware of his participation in the
fraudulent scheme. For an analysis of the opinion in Rolf, see Comment, Reckless Con-
duct: The Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor as a Concurrent Tortfeasor, 45 BROoxLYs
L. Rav. 1391 (1979).
149 See Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.
1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 903
(1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins., Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970); Butterman v. Walston & Co., 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins., Co., 324 F. Supp. 189
(N.D. Tex.), affd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
19801
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ter.150 Since Aaron rejects the requirement of scienter in an en-
forcement action to enjoin an aider and abettor, it cannot be
harmonized through the same rationale.
The difficulty with the Aaron opinion lies in the conflict be-
tween its finding of fact and its conclusion of law.151 The court
reaffirmed that in the Second Circuit negligence is sufficient to
sustain an SEC enforcement action to enjoin a defendant from
violating rule 10b-5.'s At the same time, the court held that
Aaron had aided and abetted violations of the rule.153 Although
negligence may indeed be the appropriate standard in this con-
text with respect to a primary wrongdoer, negligence is clearly
insufficient to support a finding of aiding and abetting a rule
10b-5 violation.1" Because it is apparent from the facts that
Aaron's state of mind with respect to his conduct exceeded neg-
ligence,15 5 it is unlikely that the Second Circuit's finding of aid-
ing and abetting was grounded in mere negligence. Therefore,
the court's determination is consistent with traditional aiding
and abetting analysis. A danger, however, exists in the court's
failure to discuss the requirement of knowledge at all, for this
void may provide authority for future courts to extend unrea-
sonably the reach of aiding and abetting liability.
Joseph A. DeGirolamo
Editor's Note:
On June 2, 1980, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit's decision in Aaron.'" Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, stated that "the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably
leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation
of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plain-
tiff or the nature of the relief sought. 1 57 The Court firmly re-
150 570 F.2d at 46-48.
" See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
151 605 F.2d at 619.
153 Id. at 617.
I See Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) ("some allegation
of facts implying knowledge or reckless disregard is necessary [for the imposition of aid-
ing and abetting liability,] a mere negligence standard cannot be used").
" See note 110 supra.
15 Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
Id. at 1952.
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jected the Commission's reliance on SEC v. Capital Gains1 as
the controlling precedent by contrasting Capital Gains with
Hochfelder on the basis of legislative history and the effect of
the language of the particular statutory provision involved.169
In addition, the majority found that the language of section
17(a) requires a finding of scienter under section 17(a)(1), but
not under section 17(a)(2) or section 17(a)(3).160 In so doing, the
Court emphasized the unambiguous language of section 17(a),
and found further justification for its decision by noting that
there is no "very clear expression of congressional intent in the
legislative history" such as would "justify the conclusion that
the statute does not mean what it so plainly seems to say."161
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun dissented from
the majority's section 10(b) holding. The dissent adopted the
policy oriented approach of the Second Circuit majority and
contended that the Court's "wooden analysis" of Hochfelder
"unnecessarily undercuts the Commission's authority to police
the marketplace."""
15 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
159 100 S. Ct. at 1954.
160 Id. at 1956.
Is1 Id.
162 Id. at 1959.
19801

